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Desire is a lack of being[;] … it bears witness to the existence of lack
in the being of human reality.
— Jean-Paul Sartre
THEORIZING THE AMBIGUOUS RELATIONSHIP between desire andexperience, Jean-Paul Sartre realized desire’s precarious, if notparadoxical dependence upon the tension between presence and
absence: desire’s very insatiability testifies to its origins beyond objective
conciliation. It is upon this philosophical premise that Douglas Glover
hinges his short stories “My Romance” and “Iglaf and Swan.” In both
stories, Glover explores the epistemological problems that arise when
those objects that we desire most are traumatically displaced only to re-
veal the lack that lies at the core of being. Reluctant to revel in post-
modern incertitude, Glover’s stories demonstrate a compelling movement
from a confrontation with desire and nothingness, to a realization that the
only redeeming desire, however ephemeral, is that which one finds in an
“other,” or in the recognition of a mutually intrinsic desire for the infi-
nite in one’s object of love. Demonstrating a concern with the proxim-
ity between the compulsion to satisfy sensual appetite and the inclination
towards linguistic expression, Glover allows his exploration of longing to
extend beyond the parameters of his narrative and into the realm of al-
legory. From the self-reflexive title “My Romance,” with its coy allusion
to both narrator and author, to Iglaf and Swan’s tragic conflation of the
desire for the other with the will for literary acumen, Glover’s stories
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foreground an ostensible preoccupation with the link between desire, art,
and death. Recognizing language as central to all experience, Glover, in
“My Romance” and “Iglaf and Swan,” allegorically invokes writing as a
medium compelled by insatiable desire, a manifestation of our human
impulse to objectively inscribe our fascination with the pure loss, death,
trauma, and love at the limits of human experience.
In his essay “The Novel as Poem,” Glover, following Vladimir
Nabokov, makes a critical distinction between a novel (or story’s)
“aboutness” and the formal methods used to deliver its plot:
When Nabokov makes a distinction between “what the book is
about” and our “artistic appreciation” of the book, he is separating
our reading of the subject, story and characters — the book’s
aboutness — from our appreciation of the book’s so-called artistic
qualities, the details we would notice if we looked at a novel the way
we look at a painting. (12)
Recognizing that in the postmodern novel, “Reality, meaning aboutness,
the good, God and the self are pushed away into the realms of the uncon-
scious, the unspeakable and the unfathomable,” and have been replaced
by a concern with the structures of language, Glover, in a later interview,
nevertheless acknowledges that good fiction ultimately resides in the two
categories’ mutual co-dependence: “Every novel contains elements of
both in a rough tension with each other” (Bryson 3). It is precisely this
“rough tension” that informs “My Romance.” Glover opens his story with
death, the most human of events; thus on its literal level, the story is
“about” death. However, by emphatically beginning with death, as trau-
matically evoked in the sentence “Our boy Neddy died when he was three
months old,” Glover simultaneously invokes an encounter with the philo-
sophical and linguistic structures that belie and inform not only his nar-
rative, but indeed all existence. The tragic loss of the infant Neddy opens
us to the absence at the existential core of both the story’s nameless nar-
rator and his wife Annie. No longer the tangible object of their desire,
Neddy comes to symbolize that desire’s lack. Confronted by this lack,
Glover’s narrator and his wife are thrust into a traumatic realization of the
incommensurable nature of desire within the realm of presence, a reali-
zation that ruptures their faith in the measures of objective experience and
plummets them into a difficult search for recovery in a life marked by
absence. Paradoxically, it is also this moment of loss that forces each char-
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acter to experience desire in its purest form for the first time. The narra-
tor’s intense longing for his lost son demonstrates that
The “object” of human desire is neither the object that saturates a
need (which, as Sartre also says, is never anything but a “state” closed
in itself) nor the fixed and preestablished object of instinct; it is, prop-
erly speaking, their negation…. it is the vanishing “object” of the
symbol, an infinitely variable and vicariable object, because it is al-
ways already deferred and “metonymized” in the ideal signifier that
annuls it. (Borch-Jacobsen 201)
When Neddy dies, he becomes the negated object of his parents’ natural
desire. His absence from objective experience establishes him as an ideal
signifier that has been infinitely deferred. The strength of their parental
desire for contact with their son, however, is increased exponentially by
its incommensurable nature. What was once a yearning that could be
appeased by being in their son’s presence is radically reconfigured as a
yearning for Neddy’s ideal symbol which, having been negated at the
moment of his death, remains perpetually absent. For both the narrator
and Annie this desire for the absent Neddy evolves into a complex and
psychologically damaging relationship with the impossible: to remain
estranged from Neddy’s presence, in the absence of proactive forms of
psychological mediation, will only exacerbate their profound distress; to
give in to their desire for reunification with the absent Neddy, they must
also become negated objects, positing their desire as a longing for the
impossible absence obtained only in death. The establishment of such a
link between desire and death allows Glover simultaneously to evoke the
story’s emotional “aboutness” by making apparent the emotional reality
of such loss, and to heighten the story’s philosophical concerns by com-
mencing an investigation into the primordial nature of desire: he allows
the “rough tensions” between form and style to dictate the pattern of the
narrative.
The story’s structural pattern commences with the narrator’s search
for self-recovery. Faced with unspeakable grief following the loss of his
child, he feels an overwhelming desire to have his son back; yet in so
doing, he paradoxically desires a negated object, an absence. As Borch-
Jacobsen notes, “to say that desire desires to be desired means that desire
(the subject) desires itself as desire (as subject): it wants “not to be” an
object — or, more simply, it wants not to be. Desire is desire of nothing,
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desire of the impossible, desire of death” (203). In becoming aware (at
least subconsciously) that his desire for Neddy can be reconciled only
from a subjective perspective and is, therefore, insatiable within the liv-
ing world, Glover’s narrator cannot understand “how anyone could live
through such sadness” (23). The void created by Neddy’s absence is sym-
bolized by the narrator’s persistent urge to return to Neddy’s room and
contemplate his mobile: “I was playing ‘Twinkle, twinkle, little star,’
watching the bears and stars circle above the place where Ned would have
slept” (24). The mobile circles an absence, the place where Neddy would
have been. As the narrator contemplates the empty space beneath the
mobile, the object of his desire is no longer Neddy, it is the sign of Neddy
as the negated ideal symbol which, after the child’s death, can only sig-
nify absence, configuring the narrator’s desperate longing as a desire for
nothingness, for the impossible. Like the “prickly-pear” nursery rhyme in
Eliot’s “The Hollow Men,” the mobile above Neddy’s crib spins round
and round in an endless cycle, suggesting the hopeless search the narra-
tor will endure as he struggles to reconcile the void left by his son’s death.
Once confronted with this impossible desire for absence, both the
narrator and his wife, unable to console each other, are forced to search
for means of coming to terms with Neddy’s death on their own. As the
narrator writes, “Neither of us could abide the chilly emptiness we had
fallen into, yet neither of us had the least idea how to climb out” (24). For
his part, the narrator eventually seeks to fill this void with an extramari-
tal affair with Neddy’s former pediatrician. In Dr. Tithonous, Glover’s
narrator finds someone who has also been crippled by loss and who is
desperate for reprieve from grief. Haunted by her sister’s death from
leukemia and her husband’s departure soon thereafter, Dr. Tithonous,
like the narrator, seeks to consolidate emptiness. The two find temporary
solace for their heartsickness in a sexual relationship. Aware of his long-
ing’s association with a desire for pure desire, Glover’s narrator neverthe-
less finds in Dr. Tithonous an object, an individual with whom he can
share in a doomed search for the fulfillment of that pure desire. The prox-
imity between the desire for pure desire, or pure nothingness, and sexual
desire is one that has not gone unnoticed by psychologists and literary
theorists. Once an individual has resolved the inherent similarity between
the object of desire and the manifestation of its subject, he or she must
then find a means of seeking this desire within the actual world; however,
“The problem … is that … this signifier [of pure desire] must be
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‘sexualized,’ made into an erotic ‘object,’ so that the doctrine of desire can
be reconciled with analytic experience” (Borch-Jacobsen 204). On one
level, that object becomes, for Glover’s narrator, Dr. Tithonous (and vice
versa); yet the matter is more complicated than this. Since each has con-
fronted the pure desire that is absent within, the desire that each now
seeks is one that must be subjectively manifested while, paradoxically,
symbolized by an object capable of embodying the “subject by not being
the subject” (Borch-Jacobsen 204). For the narrator, this signifier is the
Lacanian phallus, “not the organ of sexual pleasure, whether penis or
clitoris, but the transsexual ‘simulacrum’ … of its common absence; not
the man’s erect penis or the woman’s fertile womb, but the sterile cres-
cent of desire, the symbol of their impossible conjunction” (Borch-
Jacobsen 204).
The presence of the phallus as signifier of this paradoxical desire is
made evident during Dr. Tithonous’s compassionate arrival following
Neddy’s death: “Dr. Tithonous cradled her head and whispered. She
touched my wife’s breasts, she kissed her temples, she felt the baby’s cheek
with the back of her hand. … I caught myself in Annie’s full-length mir-
ror against the closet door. … I had an erection, I suddenly noticed. The
wild incongruity of this almost drove me to my knees” (27). The narra-
tor’s erection functions as both a symbol for, and a manifestation of, the
problematic desire for an object reflected in the absence at the core of the
subject. It suggests at once a physical desire for conciliation with the lost
object, and a realization that such conciliation, as signified by the cres-
cent-moon phallus (only a partial circle, a desire not completed) is impos-
sible. In the phallus, the subject recognizes a demand within him- or
herself to both retrieve desire and to be the object of desire: “the object
is ‘annulled’ in its particularity and ‘raised … to the function of the
signifier’ of the other’s love. Now it is an object in which the subject loves
himself (a signifier in which he signifies himself)” (Borch-Jacobsen 208).
Given that such self-signification is an inherently subjective experience,
the consummation of a pure desire with an “other” object of desire is im-
possible. Thus, although Glover’s narrator and Dr. Tithonous recognize
each other as objects of desire and desire each other’s presence as a means
of filling the absence left by their respective traumatic experiences, the
subjectivity of their respective desires alienates them from the possibility
of objective conciliation. Instead, their desires return in the alienated form
of the “other” as object of need, forcing them to either continue to at-
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tempt to satiate them sexually, or to admit that true consummation can-
not be obtained in the object of need, that it exists only in negation.
Plagued by the knowledge that sexual desire, as signified by the erotic
phallus, is merely a substitute for the lost object, the narrator seeks a means
of coming to terms with his crisis. However, any such conciliation, as
Glover seems to acknowledge, is impeded by the self’s status as a being
within language. Given that the absent object of desire resides in its linguis-
tic negation, knowledge of that object is complicated by the object’s cor-
roboration with linguistic systems. Though in Freudian terms desire begins
the moment the child is born into language, desire does not end at the
moment of the child’s death; rather, the absent object of desire remains
present linguistically as a signified permanently removed from its signifiers.
However, Glover does not use such philosophical structures simply to in-
terrogate the nature of language and reality from a poststructural perspec-
tive; rather, he does so to capture the sense of longing and confusion that
such structures instigate within the human psyche: he allows them to con-
tribute to the story’s “aboutness” while simultaneously using his investiga-
tion of such structures to reflect and inform the writing process in a
self-reflexive manner. The story’s title “My Romance,” for example, func-
tions as a double signifier, literally suggesting the narrator’s complicated re-
lationship with the notion of romance and allegorically suggesting Glover’s
own “romance” with the interstices of language, death, and desire. Other
such self-reflexive moments are casually weaved into the narrator’s dialogue:
“Language is a machine of desire. It works along an axis defined by hope
and future. When there is no hope, no imaginable future, the mysterious
bonds of syntax, the wires that convey the energy of meaning from word
to word, disintegrate” (26). Here Glover’s narrator draws an overt corre-
lation between the hope required for one to continue within the world and
the hope required for language to signify on a meaningful level. Given that
desire requires the illusion of potential unification with a linguistic signi-
fied, either present or ideal, one can surmise that desire itself cannot exist
without language, “the mysterious bonds of syntax.”
Such an assertion draws an overt correlation with the practice of
writing in general, and the practice of writing “desire” in particular. As
Maurice Blanchot posits, “Language can only begin with the void; no
fullness, no certainty can ever speak; something essential is lacking in
anyone who expresses himself. … This formulation explains why litera-
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ture’s ideal has been the following: to say nothing, to speak in order to
say nothing” (“Literature”  43). Just as the narrator’s desire begins with
absence, with the lack created by Neddy’s death, and just as his insatia-
ble desire — as manifested in his affair with Dr. Tithonous —  demon-
strates an unrequitable urge to unite with that absence, Glover’s text itself
functions as a “machine of desire”: it perceives the absence of meaning at
the centre of understanding and desires to fill that absence by writing it,
an act that ultimately proves itself as impossible as the narrator’s desire
for reconciliation with the ideal object. Both the narrator as desiree and
Glover as writer are determined by the paradox of negation, always at the
limit of desire’s fulfillment and aware of that fulfillment’s essential im-
possibility. In the same say that the narrator’s desires return to him in an
alienated fashion following his affairs with Dr. Tithonous, the writer’s
desire for articulation of the absolute is immediately subverted by that de-
sire’s linguistic grounding. As Blanchot asserts in “The Essential Solitude”:
The writer belongs to the work, but what belongs to him is only a
book, a mute accumulation of sterile words…. The writer who expe-
riences this void simply believes that the work is unfinished, and he
believes that with a little more effort and the luck of some favorable
moments, he — and only he — will be able to finish it. And so he
sets back to work. But what he wants to finish, by himself, remains
something interminable, it ties him to an illusory labor. (65)
The writer’s work returns to him in the alienated form of the book, forc-
ing him or her to recognize the disconjunction between the object of his/
her labour and his/her desire to articulate the void, to express meaning
beyond “sterile words.” Thus he/she goes on writing, demonstrating a
fascination with absence, with the infinite not unlike Glover’s protago-
nist’s compulsive desire for union with the void left by his lost son.
On the level of “aboutness,” Glover’s narrator finds himself search-
ing for solace on the literal margins of society. His affair with Dr.
Tithonous, for example, takes place on “Route 9,” on the margins of the
city at a “little motel called the Royal which climbs up a shattered lime-
stone ridge and hangs in a state of instability and tension with the scrub
pine, sumac and poison ivy trembling down the steep slopes” (28). This
search for self at city limits exists in “rough tension” with Glover’s “ar-
tistic qualities” by metaphorically linking the literal limits with Derrida’s
notion of margins as sites that decry the limits of linguistic and social
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experience. Writing, within the paternalistic logos of Western civilization,
exhibits the traits of exile, “an ‘orphan’, one whose ‘welfare cannot be
assured by any [paternal] attendance or assistance’” (Derrida qtd in Norris
41). Though Glover allegorically invokes this sense of writing as “orphan”
by orphaning the narrator’s son through negation, he furthers the allegory
by introducing the narrator to a liminal character living on the margins
of society, the scapegoat figure Mike. Mike is described as a “loner, which
is short for a divorced part-time woodcutter who spends most of his time
gambling at the harness track or riding around the Devil’s Den on his
four-wheel ATV, getting drunk” (30). As a scapegoat, Mike exists on the
edge of society and serves as a reminder of that margin: he is a deviant
tolerated by society only in the hope of keeping average individuals from
falling into a similar state of alterity. Traumatized and bereft of his ob-
ject of pure desire, Glover’s narrator comes to identify (briefly) with Mike
and his marginalized status. However, Glover’s invocation of Mike as a
scapegoat figure extends beyond the text’s literal level. Mike also allegori-
cally reflects writing’s relationship to the presence of pure speech and
thought. As Norris notes, “if writing ever presumed … to deny the pa-
ternal law of speech, then it would have to be accounted a bastard son,
or an orphan deprived of all natural hereditary rights. For it is the passage
of authority from fathers to sons … that ensures … the maintenance of
properly exercised power in family and state” (40). Though he is neither
an orphan nor a bastard, Mike’s status within the paternalistic family line
has been disrupted by his ambiguous relationship with his parents. Ben
and Marge, for example, “have a Brazilian grey Monkey named Michael,
which they keep in Mike’s former bedroom in the owner’s suite” (30).
Mike’s status within the family line, in a cruel and perverse sort of fash-
ion, has been usurped by his parents’ pet monkey. This misalignment of
lineal privilege is exacerbated by the fact that Ben and Marge tell the
narrator that “they made a will giving the motel to the Brazilian grey
monkey instead of Mike, though they made Mike the executor” (32). In
a twisted manner Mike’s parents ostracize him from paternal lineage,
dislodging his place within the conventional family paradigm, which
liminalizes his familial authority and renders him a scapegoat on the
margins of a society dominated by that same paternalistic logic. Just as
writing can only ever exist as the bastard son of pure presence or speech,
Mike’s relationship with social authority is one of exile and mar-
ginalization.
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As Derrida contends, “writing is in some sense a scapegoat, a neces-
sary evil that society tolerates only in the hope of preventing worse ills”
(Norris 42). In Mike, Glover’s narrator is confronted with a vision of the
limits, of the proximity to the margins of accepted logic that his compul-
sion to fill the void left by Neddy’s death has brought him. It is therefore
significant that the place to which the narrator travels with Mike is “a
tract of wild country called the Devil’s Den,” loosely symbolizing a place
at the limits of existence, proximate to the death and anguish associated
with its metaphoric name. It is also significant that it is while with Mike
at the Devil’s Den that the narrator first begins to confront his paradoxi-
cal and compulsive desire to fill the void left by Neddy’s death: “I tell
Mike this thing with Neddy has put me in a state. I ask him if he thinks
Annie has the moral edge on me because she just sits in the nursery weep-
ing, zonked on Zoloft and Restoril she gets from Dr. Tithonous. I tell
him I can’t stand to be with her, that I am scared to death of really feel-
ing as bad as I feel” (32). Although Mike offers very little in terms of lan-
guage-based comfort, his presence as a scapegoat helps the narrator realize
that his affair with Dr. Tithonous will not, ultimately, appease his desire.
His trip to the absolute margins with Mike functions as a deconstructive
act that allows him to see that his relation to the absent object of desire
within his own family paradigm is infinitely problematic and ultimately
incommensurable.
This realization instills in the narrator an awareness that it is from
this flawed relation with the absence at the core of his life that he must
begin to redefine his status within the world and, more specifically, his
relationship with Annie. Just as language comments upon the presence of
its signified by using eternally marginalized signifiers, Glover’s narrator,
while in the presence of the marginalized Mike, comes to the understand-
ing that he too functions as a signifier, never able to adequately describe
or satisfy the object of his desire and, thus, never able to fill that void. This
realization comes to a head when the narrator returns with Mike to the
motel following their sojourn to the Devil’s Den only to watch Mike
banish the grey Monkey that had usurped his place in the family lineage:
“I can only think how heroic the monkey looks in contrast to his human
brother, how satisfying a prospect his night of freedom and violent death
seems.… This is the old romantic trap, I think. In what sense can it be
true that the monkey’s brief, sweet sojourn in the Den can be more real,
more authentic, than a life in a warm cage?” (36). Here the narrator re-
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alizes the inherently romantic properties of his impulse to fill his lack
through deviant behaviour, both on the literal margins of society and the
moral margins of ethical responsibility. The banishing of the monkey
symbolizes the banishing of his desire to fill the lack through his sexual
liaison; it stands as a figurative deconstruction of this possibility and al-
lows the narrator to see that in order to go on living in the face of this
sadness, he must nurture a more ethical existence that both acknowledges
the absence at the core of being and accepts the paradoxes and suffering
often created by that absence: he must seek an ethical means of existing
within the “warm cage” of his marriage to Annie and in his life within
civilized society. This all becomes clear to the narrator in the days that im-
mediately follow his trip to the Devil’s Den with Mike: “I am sick in bed
for three days after this bout of drunkenness…. But it wakes me up,
wakes up my moral being.… I am not going to get through this and what
I am doing with Dr. Tithonous is wrong. I mean I am going to get
through it. I am alive, after all. But my life has changed irrevocably” (36).
It is this awareness that allows him to determine that he must cut his losses
and begin to forge a new relationship with the world, one that should
ethically begin with his wife, Annie.
Annie, for her part, also faces an epistemological crisis following the
death of her son. While the narrator seeks to distract himself from his
grief through his desperate sexual relationship, Annie falls into a deep de-
pression that borders on madness: “Annie would wake in the night,
choked with sobs, her milk seeping through the cloth of her nightgown.
‘The baby’s hungry. He needs to eat,’ she would whisper, then curl into
a tight, convulsive ball, a spasm of despair” (23). Like the narrator, Annie
also comes to desire the pure sadness created by Neddy’s absence. As Julia
Kristeva suggests, “For this type of … depressive, sadness is in reality the
only object” (qtd. in Lechte 185). In Annie’s case “The melancholic does
not search for meaning (constituted through a synthesis of signifier and
drive affect); rather, despair or pain (douleur), is the melancholic’s only
meaning” (Lechte 185). However, Annie eventually comes to realize the
inherent impossibility of resolving her grief in such a destructive manner.
While her husband learns that he must resign to the world as a system
that, like language, is incapable of creating a union with pure objective
understanding, Annie appears to realize that participation in the world,
which comes only through participation in language, will ultimately be
the only means by which she can come to terms with her grief. As Kristeva
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posits, “language begins with a dénégation … of loss.… ‘I have lost an in-
dispensable object which happens to be, in the last instance, my mother’,
the speaking being seems to say. ‘But no, because I accept to lose her, I
have not lost her (here is the dénégation), I can get her back in language’”
(qtd. in Lechte 186). Glover suggests that Annie ultimately realizes the re-
habilitating potential of such a dénégation when she, recognizing her
husband following his trip to the Devil’s, confronts him with the simple
words “Hey, you” (40), suggesting that she has resigned herself to desire’s
incommensurability in sadness and, like him, is poised to begin again
from that point of instability.
How to begin again, to posit a solid relationship in and with the
world while remaining aware of the epistemological void at the centre of
existence becomes the next obstacle. Both Glover’s narrator and Annie,
having travelled to their own respective limits, recognize that the only ob-
ject into which they can put their faith, trust, and belief in the possibil-
ity of a future marred by grief is each other, a tenuous but nevertheless
proactive resolution. They must learn to distinguish between raw need
and a desire for the other, one that can help deepen an individual’s un-
derstanding of, and relationship with, the world. According to Emmanuel
Levinas, desire for the other cannot be sated if it is treated as a thing or
object, which is ultimately what causes the narrator to realize that his
longing for Dr. Tithonous, as an object of need, cannot satisfy the void
at the core of his existence. Rather, “the metaphysical desire has another
intention; it desires beyond everything that can complete it. It is like
goodness — the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it” (Glover 34).
Both the narrator and Annie come to realize that their desire for Neddy
cannot be sated. They also realize the self-destructive consequences of
allowing that desire to lead them to avarice and melancholy. Therefore,
they recentre their desirous impulses upon each other, deepening their
understanding of the void that they both desire by attempting to expe-
rience that loss within each other. By recognizing and welcoming each
other’s vulnerability, both the narrator and Annie allow their own vulner-
ability to be called into question, simultaneously acknowledging their
respective weakness and recognizing that without each other, they can-
not viably endure in the world. Quoting Levinas, Peter Sedgwick notes
that this “‘welcoming of the other by the same’ … initiates an ethical re-
lation because such welcoming necessarily brings with it a challenge to the
autonomy and freedom of the I. In thinking the other I must think what
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is different from me, and in doing this I allow myself to be called into
question” (182). This recognition and engagement of the other consti-
tutes an ethical relationship because “the same must allow itself to be
challenged by the other in the very recognition of him or her…. As such,
it is ‘concretely produced,’ and this concrete engagement challenges the
primacy of ontology that is characteristic of the Western philosophical
tradition” (Sedgwick 182). Both Annie and the narrator have confronted
ontological difficulties; in their desire to continue in light of the knowl-
edge that presence can never be fully understood and that their desire for
their lost child can never be satisfied, they turn to each other, an ethical
gesture that forces each to confront his or her own relationship with ab-
sence while being supported by their relationship with each other. Glover
evokes this understanding when his narrator, following his affair with Dr.
Tithonous, recognizes the lost face of Neddy in that of his wife (i.e., in
the face of the other): “And all at once I feel a welling up of love for
Annie, love and passion and desire.… I want just to touch her and go on
touching her for the rest of my life.… There has never been anything else
I ever wanted and nothing more I will ever want” (40). The narrator re-
alizes that this desire is an ambivalent one, wholly based upon his recog-
nition of the other. Nevertheless, in the face of his loss, he feels ready to
submit to this ambivalent, ethical desire, one that he gives the name of
love:
Beyond us there is a void, and inside us there is a void. At the cen-
tre, the self is inscrutable. We ride the dark lunar surfaces of unknown
objects our whole lives…. And yet between this void and the shallow
dogmas of psychotherapeutics there remains some residue, some faint
sediment of — what? The thing you can’t see for looking at it, the
thing disappearing at the corner of your eye, the thing not conceived
in any of your philosophies…. This is the place where love resides, if
love resides. (40)
In each other, the narrator and Annie recognize love; it is through this
recognition that they can transcend, however ephemerally, the grief and
anguish instigated by their loss. The ethical recognition of love in the
other helps them overcome the separation of the signifier and signified
and, in so doing, subverts the compulsive desire to do so through other
less ethical and more self-destructive means.
“Iglaf and Swan” deals with a similar recognition; however, it is
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approached from a perspective that is almost opposite to that of “My
Romance.” Whereas Annie and her husband’s recognition of the ethics
and responsibilities of desire occurs at the story’s conclusion, providing
it with a tenuous sense of closure, “Iglaf and Swan” probes the difficul-
ties that arise when the ethical recognition of love in the other becomes
subordinate to the demands of the self. Glover foregrounds these concerns
by placing the moment of ethical recognition at the story’s outset rather
than at its conclusion as in “My Romance.” As his omniscient narrator
proclaims, Iglaf and Swan, following a “potluck supper and open mike
poetry reading … became lovers…. Near dawn they fell asleep in each
other’s arms, but then Swan woke up, wrapped a sheet around her breasts
… and stared at him. What was she trying to make out? What had dis-
turbed her sleep?” (47). Like Annie and her husband in “My Romance,”
Swan here experiences a desire capable of transcending, if ephemerally so,
the need to selfishly satiate compulsive human urges: she is awoken by the
ethical recognition of love in the other. Iglaf is almost simultaneously
awoken by a similar burning compulsion: “The fierceness of her regard
woke Iglaf from a dream…. Something in her face turned his heart to
stone. He knew that he loved her. He knew that she loved him. But he
knew Swan would never stay. His life was over in that moment” (47). By
beginning “Iglaf and Swan” at this point of recognition rather than con-
cluding with it as in “My Romance,” Glover shifts the focus of the story
to an exploration of the inherent difficulties of maintaining such an ethi-
cal love over the course of time, a prospect that both Iglaf and Swan rec-
ognize as doomed from the moment they recognize love in each other’s
faces. Iglaf considers it a Schopenhauerian “romantic gesture” that finds
glory in a “life of misery,” and Swan accepts the “light of love” with a
“flash of loathing” that culminates during their lovemaking: “with a rush
of gratitude, he took her in his arms, and they began to make love again,
slowly, despairingly. She wept this time. It hurt when he moved inside
her, though she whispered ‘I love you’ over and over as his passion rose.
When it was over, she loathed herself as well” (48). Clearly conflating love
and self-loathing, Glover here implies that co-extensive with the recog-
nition of ethical love in the other is the sense of persecution experienced
as subject of the other’s gaze, what Levinas identifies as the inherent re-
sponsibility of obsession: “In obsession, the self’s responsibility is, as it
were, a deficit. Its recurrence breaks open the limits of identity, the prin-
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ciple of being that lies in me, the intolerable resting in oneself proper to
definition. Such is the ego’s responsibility for what it did not will, that
is to say, responsibility for others” (89). Though both Iglaf and Swan have
much to gain from their realization of love, they also immediately recog-
nize that with their obsession comes a self-persecution caused by the
weight of responsibility towards the other that they, as subjects, must now
attempt to endure.
Although ostensibly about the troubled relationship between Iglaf,
Swan, and their daughter Lily, Glover once again allows his story’s
“aboutness” to allegorically reflect the theoretical concerns of writing and
language. By endowing each of his central characters with literary ambi-
tions, he immediately draws parallels between compulsive desire and the
compulsion to write, suggesting that the responsibility inherent in the
former may compromise the subjective impulses of the latter. In Iglaf’s
case, for instance, the responsibility of loving Swan figures itself as a form
of capitulation to an existence that restricts the primacy of the self, a re-
alization that leads him to speculate that “maybe he had never really had
the courage to be himself, a poet, an adventurer. That he had needed a
way out of that terrible struggle, that he found the lesser vision comfort-
ably definite” (48). Glover’s association of an ethical, responsible love
with a “lesser vision” is ironic. For Iglaf and Swan, however, it aggravates
the “rough tension” between their literary and social lives. In spite of the
intensity of their initial desire, the lovers grow to feel as though their re-
sponsibility to each other has compromised their responsibility to their
creative impulses; the demands of the relationship metamorphose from
a source of love and a recognition of the ethical status of the self in the
face of the other, to a source of resentment and an excuse for failed lit-
erary ambition. “I lost myself,” Swan asserts, “in my marriage” (49).
The tension between Iglaf and Swan’s tormented love and their
personal literary ambitions allows Glover to explore the proximity of hu-
man emotional desire to the desire for a sense of self conceived through
literary production. Neither productive nor particularly ambitious, Iglaf
and Swan blame their stilted literary careers on the limitations imposed
by their relationship. Feeling unfulfilled and burdened by failure, each
then turns to less ethical and often outright lascivious means of satisfy-
ing both their sexual and creative impulses. Iglaf, through his vocation as
a high-school English teacher, deliberately conflates the two in order to
lure students into sexual relationships: “Iglaf put on weight, wore vests
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and threadbare second-hand tweed jackets, smoked a pipe and affected a
world-weary wisdom which he used to seduce a series of female students.
Twice he nearly got fired from his job, but each time Swan saved him by
sitting through the internal inquiries holding his hand” (49). By adopting
the shallow and stereotypical signifiers of authorial integrity, Iglaf enacts his
quest for the satiation of his desire (and, thus, for personal fulfillment) upon
the bodies of his adolescent students. Missing from his Humbert Humbert-
style self-delusion and literary affectation is the presence of a signified —
a body of works that justifies the persona he has adopted; rather, Iglaf, in
the absence of creative production, attempts to satisfy his ambition through
predatorial sexual relationships with his students.
Similarly stifled by their relationship, Swan also seeks solace in ex-
tramarital affairs. Spending her afternoons working in a futon store, she
becomes involved with her boss Kreuzen, a Czech émigré old enough to
be her father and “also bitter, lost” (48). Reiterating the proximity of lit-
erary and creative desire, Swan, unfulfilled by her sexual affairs with
Kreuzen and discontented in her marriage, enrolls herself in a creative
writing course as a means of stimulating her imaginative impulses, a de-
cision to which Kreuzen responds with brutal honesty: “‘You never
stopped writing poetry. You’re just not very good at it…. You use art and
your lives as excuses for each other’” (49). Feeling somewhat unburdened
after splitting with Kreuzen, Swan nevertheless falls immediately into the
same pattern of using her art as an excuse for her life, and vice versa, by
beginning an affair with her creative writing instructor, a man who has
much in common with Iglaf:
The writing instructor had published one book of poems years before
and showed no promise any longer of writing another. He was mar-
ried but made a practice of sleeping with at least one of his students
each term, in fact had come to think of this as one of the require-
ments of his profession. At first he had seen his student lovers as the
bright new stars who would rouse him from his artistic slumber….
But now he resented Swan for her naive hopes, her sentimental and
self-serving little poems and her lovely body. (50)
Like Iglaf and Swan, the poetry instructor substitutes sexual satisfaction
for creative desire; the negative effect it has upon him suggests the para-
sitical nature of such a relationship. Though Swan initially derives new
energy from both the relationship and her engagement with creative prac-
tice, her lack of quality production precipitates a return to the same pat-
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tern of need-fulfillment. This constant struggle for self-expression, either
through literary production or, more commonly, sexual liaisons mimics
the complex relationship between compulsion, pleasure, desire, and tor-
ment inherent in the writing condition. “Some people suffer,” as Maurice
Blanchot asserts, “because they cannot express completely what they feel.
They are distressed by the obscurity of their feelings. They think they
would be relieved if they could turn the confusion in which they are lost
into precise words” (“Dread” 3-4). On one level, this is precisely the case
with both Iglaf and Swan. Lost in the responsibility of their marriage and
incapable of determining a sense of self through writing, they turn to sex
as a means of shoring themselves against the ruinous potential of their
longing. On another level, however, their conflict of desire and expres-
sion signifies a complicated relationship with absence. Alienated (at least
in their own minds) from the aesthetic ambitions of their youth by the
responsibility of their love for one another and, eventually, their daugh-
ter Lily, both Iglaf and Swan find themselves on the margins of literary
and aesthetic considerations, a situation that fills them at once with con-
tempt for the lack of conviction that allowed them to slip so far from the
course of their ambition, and with an even greater compulsion to satisfy
their literary ambitions through literary productivity. This launches them
into a “more and more comical condition — of having nothing to write,
of having no means of writing it, and of being forced by an extreme ne-
cessity to keep writing it…. Whatever [the writer] wants to say, it is noth-
ing. The world, things, knowledge, are … only reference points across the
void” (Blanchot, “Dread” 5). The fact that Iglaf and Swan have nothing
to say (or write) places them in an obscure relationship with nothingness;
their writerly compulsion, devoid of inspiration or direction, becomes
only a compulsion to speak an essential nothingness, a compulsion that
is, of course, paradoxical: for nothingness taken as an end can manifest
itself only as a desire for annihilation. It is their realization of this tension
between their literary impulses and nothingness and their dread of its
epistemological implications that causes them to turn away from writing
and towards sex as a means of satisfaction.
By identifying this relationship between writing, nothingness, and
sexual desire, Glover evokes the writerly disposition less as one connected
with a particular vocation than as metaphor for a fundamental human
condition. Iglaf and Swan’s personal torment is at once linked to their
lack of literary devotion and evocative of the torment experienced by
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writers attempting to come to terms with creative desires that are inher-
ently incommensurable. These allegorical implications are made most
clear by the presence of their daughter Lily. Alienated by her parents’
separation and forced to endure their contemptuous self-pity and com-
pulsive respites in the arms of lovers, Lily is forced to endure worldly
burdens that are well beyond her years, making her at once insightful and
profoundly alone. Also interested in writing, Lily intuitively connects it
with death even in childhood: “She had a fantasy, a vision of her own
death, and her father coming upon her writings in an old trunk under her
bed, weeping at the beauty of her words” (52). Mystified by her “frigid,
hysterical travesty of a family” (53), Lily also intuitively associates love
with death: “She thought the forced cheerfulness of her parents, seated
across from each other at the dinner table, was love, but love made her
feel as if there were an iron belt around her belly, linched tighter and
tighter each day. Love made her want to die” (53). In direct opposition
to that of her parents, Lily’s relationship with the nothingness at the cen-
tre of experience is hyper-developed, a fact that both informs her youth-
ful writing, and leads to her eventual suicide. For Lily, “Nothingness had
a voluptuousness she found nowhere else in life. She became greedy for
it the way others become greedy for sex…. Nothingness became her lover”
(55). Robbed of her youthful innocence, Lily’s romanticization of noth-
ingness, on one level, is a response to her disaffected relationship with her
parents; in Kristevan terms, she finds a measure of support in her solitude
until, ultimately, she retreats fully into that which provides her precari-
ous support: “The depressive mood constitutes itself as a narcissistic sup-
port, negative to be sure, but nevertheless presenting the self with an
integrity, nonverbal though it might be” (Kristeva 19). On an allegorical
level, Iglaf and Swan’s neglect of their daughter can be explained as a
writerly response to her as the product of their work. In the same man-
ner that Blanchot suggests the book is the mere accumulation of a writ-
er’s words that, providing no sense of finality once completed, leaves the
writer feeling that writing more is the only means of filling the void across
which he or she stares, Lily is the product of Iglaf and Swan’s desire, a de-
sire that they each conflate with literary ambition. Though both acknowl-
edge Lily as the product of their love and work, both also feel unsatisfied
with Lily-as-product. In each, the compulsion to create, manifested sexu-
ally and through failed attempts at self-expression, remains interminable
and supercedes their ethical responsibility to their daughter. It takes Lily’s
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suicide to make Iglaf and Swan realize, if only briefly, that their selfish
ambition contributed to their daughter’s death. It also briefly revives the
ethical recognition of the other that had initially caused them to fall in
love and led to the creation of Lily: “When they made love, finally, they
wept and said Lily’s name. They had never before felt so close, and the
closeness aroused them. Without saying anything, they both knew they
wanted to make another child, to call back the girl that had died, the fam-
ily they had never had” (56). Following Lily’s death, Iglaf and Swan rec-
ognize that their failure of ethical responsibility led to the neglect of their
daughter and to her eventual suicide. However, this moment of recognition
is brief and their compulsion to “make another child” overcomes their
mourning for the absent Lily. Lily’s death quickly becomes reconstituted
as a moment of tragedy meant to reflect and inform their doomed-artist
dispositions: “they only wished that the moment could go on and on and
on, that they could exist forever on the cusp of someone else’s death, that
they could always feel this important, tragic and redeemed” (56).
Both Iglaf and Swan exploit their daughter’s suicide as a means of
aligning themselves with tragic literary history and substituting their
daughter’s death for their own literary sterility. Iglaf often “invoked Lily
and the names of other poetic suicides and somehow managed to im-
ply that he was one of them, only not quite dead yet” (57). Swan had
Lily’s poems published, drawing comparisons between her daughter and
other female poetic suicides such as Plath and Sexton. She then gave
public readings of Lily’s work, often forgetting that “they weren’t her
poems. She felt like herself, beautiful and poetic, the centre of attention,
with the lights shining down and her strong, unflattering voice declaim-
ing the words of the one person she had truly loved (who, in those mo-
ments, did not seem distinguishable from herself)” (58). The suggestion
that Swan had difficulty distinguishing her love for Lily from her love
for herself in these literary moments reinforces the selfish ambition
demonstrated by both parents and serves only to highlight how literary
and sexual desire took precedence over their ethical responsibility to
those they most loved.
Ultimately, Lily’s suicide appears to make Iglaf and Swan recog-
nize, at least on a nascent level, their mistake. For a mature Swan,
“Words like fate and history and love slip through her head but find no
place to catch and hold…. Beyond the words, there exists only a mys-
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terious emptiness…. She has gotten it wrong, but what if she is wrong
about getting it wrong?” (60). In Iglaf’s case, the “phrase ‘aborted
dreams’ sticks in his mind, and he remembers a dream from long ago,
something about a book he had read or written” (60). Recalling the
dream he was awoken from on the night he fell in love with Swan, Iglaf
is also startled by an epiphany. These epiphanic moments suggest a
recognition that literary desire is ultimately devoid of signification in
the human sense; their compulsion to play the role of tragic artist has
doomed them to “belong to the shadow of events instead of the object,
to what allows the words themselves to become images, appearances —
instead of signs, values, the power of truth” (Blanchot, “Essential” 67).
The human contact that transpires in this final scene seems to awaken
them to the fact that their failure was in their reaching beyond the limits
of ethical responsibility: “In her confusion, Swan reaches for Iglaf and
touches his wrist protectively. Iglaf feels her touch and falls silent. The
warmth of her hand seems a balm for all his wounds” (60). This recog-
nition of a tenuous faith in the other as the only means of ethical rec-
onciliation comes too late. It does, however, reinforce Glover’s link
between the human condition and the writing condition. Like writers
overly absorbed by the activity of decrying an essential absence, Iglaf
and Swan, through a compulsive search for an essential literary self,
nearly deny their own desire for presence in the world, an act that
proves at once impossible and destructive.
In both “My Romance” and “Iglaf and Swan,” the characters’ ethi-
cal epiphanies, whether fully realized or not, provide an instance of reso-
lution for Glover’s writerly allegory. The assertion that only in the ethical
recognition of the other can the division between signifier and signified
be overcome suggests a resistance on Glover’s part to allow the self-reflex-
ive, writerly concerns of his narrative to be fully subordinated to the realm
of linguistic play. Rather, by invoking this ethical conclusion, Glover
appears to suggest that for self-reflexive, postmodern fiction to function
proactively, it too must recognize its other in “aboutness,” in the rough
tension that defines its relation to its hermeneutic “other.” By navigating
this interstice between desire and language, fiction of the heart and fic-
tion of the postmodern mind, Glover betrays his own desire to transcend
the two categories and to extend fiction closer to both its epistemologi-
cal and ontological limits.
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